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CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOGNIZING
COURT MANDATED ARBITRATION:
PARADISE FOUND OR
PROBLEMS ABOUND?
"It has become a truism that we are the most litigious people on earth, and
that our machinery for processing all this litigation is sorely over-taxed. If we
cannot learn to live together more harmoniously, we must find a means to disagree
more efficiently."'
"Arbitration is recognized in Colorado as a desirable method of resolving
'2
disputes, and is to be fostered rather than discouraged."
Firelock Inc. v. District Court3

I. THE PROBLEM

In 1988, McGhee Communications, Inc. brought an action against Firelock
Incorporated claiming Firelock had not paid for advertising services which
McGhee had performed. 4 Suit was filed in the Boulder County District Court.5
McGhee certified that the probable recovery would not exceed $50,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and alleged that the case was not exempt from mandatory
6
arbitration.
In its answer, Firelock denied the claimed amount was owed, put forth several
affirmative defenses, and demanded a jury trial. 7 Firelock also petitioned the
court to prevent the case from being assigned to mandatory arbitration under
Colorado's Mandatory Arbitration Act8 (hereinafter the "Act"). In support of this
motion, Firelock claimed the Act violated:
1. separation of powers (Art. III, Art. IV, sections 1 and 9 of the
Colorado Constitution);

1. Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitrationin the FederalCourts: The PhiladelphiaStory,
42 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983).
2. Wales v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 255, 256 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).
3. 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1989).
4. Id. at 1092.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. CoLO.REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-401 to -409 (1987).
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2. right of access to courts (Art. II, section 6);
3. right to trial by jury (Art. II, section 23);
4. express Colorado constitutional prohibition against mandatory
arbitration (Art. XVIII, section 3); and
5. equal protection (Art. II, section 25 and the equal protection clause
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). 9

Cf

The trial court denied Firelock's challenge. Firelock then petitioned the
Colorado Supreme Court requesting the issuance of an order preventing the district
court from referring the case to arbitration. 10 Also, Firelock urged the Colorado
Supreme Court to declare the Mandatory Arbitration Act unconstitutional. 1 1
In its holding, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled the Act did not violate the
separation of powers doctrine, the right of access to courts, the right to trial by
Constitution
jury, the equal protection clause, or a provision of the Colorado 12
giving the General Assembly authority over consensual arbitration.
This Note will argue that notwithstanding any criticism of the court-annexed
arbitration procedure, the Colorado Supreme Court is taking a leadership position
in upholding and expanding the role for arbitration, by recognizing that this form
of alternative dispute resolution is less expensive, saves judicial time, provides for
confidentially, and most importantly, provides the parties with a sense of fairness
in the outcome.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

A. Arbitration
Arbitration, one of the oldest forms of dis ute resolution, can be traced back
to the ancient Egyptian and Greek cultures. 13 Arbitration's "popularity as a
method of resolving disagreements among parties has continued to wax and wane
in response to different forces at various periods in Anglo-American legal history."14 Arbitration's "modern era," however, did not really begin until after
World War I when arbitration agreements were first considered legally valid and
15
enforceable.

9. 776 P.2d at 1093.
10. Id. at 1092.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1091.
13. See Nejelski & Zeldin, supra note 1, at 789 (citing Sarpy, Arbitration as a Means of Reducing
Court Congestion, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 182, 184 (1965)).
14. Id.
15. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924) (requiring that a court action
be stayed upon a showing that a valid contract provision mandates that the parties arbitrate their dispute).
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By definition, arbitration is a process where parties to a dispute agree to
present their cases before an neutral third party. 16 Historically, arbitration was
perceived to have many advantages over traditional litigation. First, although the
parties themselves compensate the arbitrator, arbitration is still seen as less
expensive than traditional adjudication. 17 Second, arbitration almost always
provides a time savings for the parties, as well as providing relief for otherwise
overcrowded court dockets. 18 Third, although trial judges may be experts in the
law, many parties would rather present their case in front of a recognized expert
in the field of their dispute. 19 And finally, as most arbitration hearings are held
in private, many potential litigants perceive this confidential setting as a significant
20
legal and business advantage.
B. Court-annexedArbitration
In 1958, Chief Justice Earl Warren, in a speech to the American Bar
Association, detailed the nearly 70,000 case backlog in the federal court system
and discussed the problems resulting from such delays. 2 1 By 1970, the number
of cases filed but not yet heard had increased to over 114,00022 and by 1976
that figure grew to almost 160,00023 cases.
In 1977, when Griffin Bell was appointed United States Attorney General by
President Jimmy Carter, he recognized the need for judicial reform by creating an
Office of Imrovements in the Administration of Justice within the Justice
Department. 2X This new office made several recommendations, including "a
proposal for court-annexed arbitration of civil cases in the federal courts."
Attorney General Bell's thoughts on the subject were not new. The viability
(i.e., constitutionality) of court-annexed arbitration has been tested many times in
the past. Two cases from Pennsylvania are routinely discussed and cited for the
proposition that mandatory arbitration statutes do not infringe on the constitutional
26
right to a jury trial or the right of access to courts.

16. Norris, National Trends in Mandatory Arbitration, 17 CoLO. LAw 1313 (1988).
17. Id. at 1314.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, The Problem of Delay: A Task for Bench and Bar
Alike, 44 A.B.A. J. 1043, 1044 (1958).
22. Management Statistics for the United States Courts--1975, at 126 (National Statistical Profile
from 1970-75).
23. Management Statistics for the United States Courts--1980, at 129 (National Statistical Profile
from 1975-80).
24. Nejelski, CourtAnnexed Arbitration, 14 FORUM 215 (1978).
25. Id.
26. Hoffman, The Constitutionalityof Mandatory Arbitration, 18 CoLO. LAw. 455 (1989).
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In Re Smith27 upheld a Pennsylvania statute which provides that "all cases
which are at issue where the amount in controversy shall be one thousand dollars
or less...shall first be submitted to and heard by a board of three members of the
bar of the county for consideration and award." 28 While stating clearly that the
Act would be unconstitutibnal if the arbitrators decision was unappealable, "there
is no denial of the right of trial by jury if the statute preserves that right to each
of the parties by the allowance of an appeal . . . the only purpose of the
constitutionalprovision is to secure that the right of trial by jury ...[is] finally
determined."29
Similarly, in Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn,30 the federal district court upheld
a local rule establishing mandatory arbitration. The court held that compulsory
arbitration with a right to demand trial de novo after an arbitration award did not
violate the Seventh Amendment right of trial by jury and did
not violate the
31
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has used the right to jury trial ground
for striking down an Illinois law requiring arbitration for minor automobile
accident cases 3 2 and the separation of powers ground for disapproving
the
33
mandatory arbitration provisions in the Illinois tort reform legislation.
With regard to the equal protection argument, the various states are also in
conflict. An Ohio court in Grayley v. Satayatham34 struck down an Ohio act
on equal protection grounds, while the Arizona Supreme Court in Eastin v.
Broomfield35 upheld a similar statute. Some of the differences of opinion on
these issues no doubt occur because of the specific language in each state
constitution. Other variances perhaps take place as the states are still seeking true
guidance and leadership in the court-annexed arbitration arena.
C. The Colorado Mandatory Arbitration Act
The Colorado Mandatory Arbitration Act was signed into law on May 28,
1987, and is designed to be effective from January 1, 1988 until July 1, 1990.36
The Act is a self-described "pilot project" designed to apply to all civil cases, filed
in eight selected judicial districts of Colorado, 37 which seek money damages of

27. 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955).
28. Id. at 227, 112 A.2d at 628.
29. Id. at 230-31, 112 A.2d at 629 (citations omitted).
30. 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
31. Id.
32. Grace v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
33. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Assoc., 63 Il. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
34. 74 Ohio App. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976).
35. 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (en banc).
36. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-402(1) (1987).
37. The selected judicial districts are the first, third, sixth, seventh, eighth, fourteenth, eighteenth,
and twentieth.
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$50,000 or less. 38 Matters exempt from mandatory arbitration include controversies involving governmental entities or employees, persons meeting Colorado
Court indigency guidelines, and cases where equitable relief is
Supreme
39
sought.
A key feature of the new court-annexed procedure provides that a party
appealing an arbitrator's award, and thereby requesting a trial de novo, will be
judgment does not improve the
assessed costs, of up to $1,000, if the trial court's
40
appellant's position by more than ten percent.
The Colorado Act makes the selection and compensation of the arbitrator the
responsibility of the parties. 4 1 With regard to the arbitration hearing itself, 4it2
should be informal and is not required to conform to strict rules of evidence.
failure to appear at all
The parties may appear with or without counsel, however,
43
will constitute waiver of the right to a trial de novo.
It is within these historical parameters regarding alternative dispute resolution
and the current Colorado Mandatory Arbitration Act, that the action in Firelock
v. District Court began.
III.

THE INSTANT DECISION

As drafted, the Colorado Supreme Court decision is important because it
examines five potential challenges to the Mandatory Arbitration Act, any of which
could invalidate the entire Act. The court, after discussing each area, concludes
however, that the Act44"does not violate the Colorado Constitution or the United
States Constitution."
A. Separation of Powers
Firelock contended the Act violated the separation of powers provision of the
Colorado Constitution, in that "the Act is an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
power to unqualified private citizens because it allows arbitration to be conducted
by persons who are not members of the judiciary, but indeed who do not even
have to be licensed attorneys." 4 5 In response, the court notes that "the act does
not vest judicial authority in another branch of government ...because the
arbitration panels do not perform a judicial function." 4 6 For their authority, the
justices looked to previous decisions which held that the essence of a "court" is

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
(1987).
43.
44.
45.
46.

CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-22-402(2) (1987).
CoLO.REV. STAT. § 13-22-402(5-6) (1987).
See Hoffman, supra note 26, at 456.
CoLO.REV. STAT. § 13-22-403(1-4) (1987).
See Littlefield, Court-Annexed Arbitration Comes to Colorado, 16 COLO. LAW. 1941, 1944
Id.
776 P.2d at 1100.
Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1095.
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having the authority to apply a remedy. 47 "It is clear that, under the Act, the
arbitrators' decision is not an exercise of the sovereign power of the state because
the decision is non-binding, and the arbitrators do not perform a judicial function
because they do not possess the final authority to render and enforce a judgment." 48 The Colorado Supreme Court follows the lead of many49 other states
which also hold that arbitrators do not perform judicial functions.
B.

Right of Access to Courts

Firelock's next claim was the Act violates the parties' right to access to the
court system by forcing potential litigants to arbitrate their claims before an
arbitrator prior to going to trial. 50 The court disagrees, stating "[m]any other
reasonable burdens similar to the one imposed by the Act are present within our
system of justice." 5 1 Also, the decision looks to the fact that "because the Act
does
provides for de novo review of the decision of the arbitration panel... 5[it]
2
not place an unreasonable burden on the right of access to the courts."
C. Right to a Jury Trial
Firelock further contended that the Colorado Constitution "establishes a
constitutional right to a jury trial in civil actions and the Act impermissibly
infringes on this right." 5 In holding otherwise, the Colorado Supreme Court
States
first considered Edwards v. Elliott 4 which states that "the United 55
Constitution's guarantee of a civil jury trial does not apply to the states."
The court next examines the Colorado Constitution, article II, section 23
which provides that "[tihe right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal
cases; but a jury in civil cases in all courts, or in criminal cases in courts not of
56
record, may consist of less than twelve persons, as may be prescribed by law."
The Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as meaning "that trial

47. Id. at 1094.
48. Id. See Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 287, 385 A.2d 57, 65 (1978) (because
either party can reject the decision of the arbitration panel and because the panel cannot enforce its
decision even if the parties accept it, the panels do not exercise the judicial power of the state in the
constitutional sense).
49. See DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial Hosp., 628 F.2d 287,292 (4th Cir. 1980)
(following Virginia law); Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 356-57 (Alaska 1988);
Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171, 1178 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 110,
256 N.W.2d 657, 666-67 (1977); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 520-22, 261
N.W.2d 434, 448-49 (1978).
50. 776 P.2d at 1095.
51. Id. at 1096.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 88 U.S. 532 (1874).
55. Id. at 557.
56. 776 P.2d at 1096-97.
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by a jury in a civil action is not a matter of right under the Colorado Constitution." 5 7 Additionally, as "the Act provides for de novo review by the district
court, thereby giving either party the opportunity for a jury trial, and the provision
for the payment of the costs of arbitration if the party does not increase its
position8 by ten percent is not an unreasonable burden on the availability of a jury
5
trial."
D. Equal Protection Clause
Firelock also argued that as the Act creates two classifications of litigants,
depending if the lawsuit is filed in a judicial district designated for the arbitration
pilot program or not, the entire Act should be deemed unconstitutional as it
violates the equal protection clauses of both the Colorado and United States
Constitutions. 59 "In interpreting the equal protection guarantee under the
Colorado Constitution, we (the Colorado Supreme Court) have followed the
analytical mode developed by the United States Supreme Court in construing the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 60 "The equal protection
persons who are similarly situated will receive like
clause guarantees that 6 all
1
treatment by the law."
In ruling the Act did not violate the equal protection clause of either
constitution, the court opines that "the General Assembly's decision to examine
or failure of the Act in eight pilot districts is not a violation of equal
the success 62
protection."
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislation merely because
it is special, or limited in its application to a particular geographical or
political subdivision of the state. Rather, the Equal Protection Clause is
offended only if the statute's classification 'rests on 6 rounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of that State's objective.'
While the Colorado court recognizes that "administrative convenience is not
legitimate
governmental purpose," 64 the "General Assembly chose to examine
a
the success or failure of the Act by implementing its provisions in several judicial
districts for a limited period of time during which evidence could be gathered to
determine whether the Act would be beneficial on a statewide basis." 65 As

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1097. See Setchell v. Dellacroce, 169 Colo. 212, 215, 454 P.2d 804, 806 (1969).
776 P.2d at 1096-97.
Id.
Id. See Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 674 (Colo. 1987).
Id. See J.T. v. O'Rourke, 651 P.2d 407, 413 (Colo. 1982).
776 P.2d at 1098.
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1978).
Tassian, 731 P.2d at 676.
776 P.2d at 1098.
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"arbitration is favored by the law in Colorado," 6 6 "we hold that the Act does not
protection guarantee of the United States and Colorado
violate the equal
67

Constitutions."

When considering all these factors together, the rule of law handed down by
the Colorado Supreme Court is one which examines the relevant constitutional
issues and holds that court-annexed arbitration is legally sound and pending the
results of this pilot program, could further open the door to expanded judicial
recognition of other methods of alternative dispute resolution.
IV.

COMMENT: THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

To be fair, the accolades given to arbitration and the other substitutes for
traditional litigation are not universally shared. In his article Against Settlement,6 8 Yale University Law School Professor Owen Fiss delivers a stinging
critique of the settlement (i.e., alternative dispute resolution) process. Fiss argues:
Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck someone without
authority; the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial
involvement troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may
not be done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the
of mass society and should neither be encouraged nor
conditions
69
praised.
Conversely, in supporting arbitration and other forms of resolving conflicts,
Professor Leo Kanowitz of the University of California, Hastings College of the
Law, contends:
The widespread use of settlement and alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms appears, therefore, to respond to a felt need on the part of
disputants. Whether their purpose is to avoid the cost, delay, complexity,
uncertainty, or anxiety of adjudication, disputants commonly resolve their
conflicts in ways other than a full-blown trial. Clearly, there are social
as well as personal advantages in avoiding litigation. Were every
potentially litigable dispute actually submitted to a full judicial trial,
courthouses, bailiffs, etc--would
present adjudicatory resources--judges,
70
have to be augmented exponentially.
Additional support for avoiding the traditional courtroom litigation process
comes directly from "the ...revision of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil

66. See Dominion Ins. Co. v. Hart, 178 Colo. 451, 498 P.2d 1138 (1972).
67. 776 P.2d at 1099.
68. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
69. Id. at 1075.
70. Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the PublicInterest: The ArbitrationExperience,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 242 (1987).
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Procedure, which encouraged pretrial consideration of and action on 'the
of settlement or the use of extra-judicial procedures to resolve the dispossibility
71
pute.'
Similar to Colorado, other state court systems approve of the arbitration
procedure. For example, in Smith v. Zepp,72 the Montana Supreme Court recogmeans available to parties
nized arbitration as "the most speedy and economical
73
for a binding resolution of their disputes."
Make no mistake, full-scale adoption of court-annexed arbitration will not, and
indeed, is not designed to make litigation a less plausible or obsolete form of
"proven to be an efficient and equitable
lawyering. Arbitration has, however,
74
method of resolving claims."
Specifically, with regard to constitutionally upholding the Mandatory
Arbitration Act, the Colorado Supreme Court is working to make arbitration a
viable, effective, and efficient substitute for litigation. The court correctly
recognizes that the arbitration process is not a judicial tool that trades important
constitutional rights for case expediency, but is a procedure which is respectful of
the rights of the parties. The constitutional protections remain, only the parties are
given an alternative forum in which they can resolve their differences before
heading to the courts.
In the end, the issue of fairness will most likely determine if this program
succeeds or fails. Another important factor will be the quality of the men and
women selected to serve as arbitrators. If the potential litigants perceive that they
were presented with an equal opportunity to put forth their complaint to a knowing
and informed arbitrator, who, in turn, handed down a rational and reasonable
decision, the Act can certainly succeed. The holding of the instant case is
insightful and well reasoned to meet the changing needs of today's society. In
sanctioning this court-annexed arbitration by ruling it constitutional, the Colorado
Supreme Court validates the principle that this type of alternative dispute resolution is effective because it is administered by a neutral party who is an expert in
the field of the dispute, is less expensive, results in a substantial savings of time,
and provides a measure of confidentially for the parties.
ScoTT M. BADAti

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 243.
173 Mont. 358, 567 P.2d 923 (1977).
Id. at 369, 567 P.2d at 929.
Testa, Slimming the Docket--A View From the Bench, 58 FLA. B.J. 60 (1984).
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